the U.S. on International Anticorruption Day

Last week marked International Anticorruption Day. Such days, designated with purportedly global values, are at best an opportunity for press releases that might otherwise go unnoticed, and often are no more than an annual event for relevant NGOs to preach to the choir while feeling like someone is finally listening.


The Obama administration chose to recognize the day with a video statement by Secretary Clinton released on the web. In addition to general approbation for the fight against corruption, Clinton mentioned the two major U.S. priorities in this battle: reducing corruption in international aid, and stopping private sector bribery through the OECD convention. Both of these goals are lofty but relevant and genuinely important, as they are the major ways in which rich countries perpetuate corruption around the world. It is truly admirable how the U.S. has promoted the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and upheld it at home. Its efforts to fight corruption in development aid have faced a broader range of challenges, such as how to reach vulnerable populations in highly corrupt countries or how to balance other national interests against this aspect of foreign policy. Still, it is important that Clinton took the time to make the statement, and that U.S. priorities remain appropriate to the problem at hand.

the Karzai government

Perhaps the most high-profile government associated with corruption these days is that of Afghanistan. The Karzai government has been solidly supported by the Americans and their allies since its original appointment, and some people considered the evidence of corruption in the recent elections as a blow to the entire U.S.-led effort there. After all, if the coalition allies are supporting a president who rigs elections, how are we to have any credibility ourselves?

It was not surprising that the elections were riddled with corruption. And while vote rigging does not automatically mean that an entire system is plagued, in Afghanistan's case the accusation holds water. In the absence of infrastructure, education, and industry, it is natural that Afghanistan would remain a very tribal country. However, local norms are no excuse for using one's power to take advantage of ordinary people. Tribal leaders can provide guidance and cohesiveness without skimming off the top and condemning their people to continued poverty.

Corruption can only be fought from the top. Unless the Karzai government is prepared to take some serious risks and make some new enemies, the kind of systemic change that will be necessary to fight Afghan corruption will not be possible. On the other hand, corruption is not an invincible adversary. A strong and positive example from the government, a solid anti-corruption infrastructure, and an unassailable judiciary can make a noticeable difference, even in a country as complex as Afghanistan. The Karzai government can choose what it wishes its legacy to be.

the aftermath of UN negotiations

Like all international treaties, the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) is a product of its time. Its particular time - the past 10 years or so - is one in which everyone is ready to say that corruption is wrong but no one is fully prepared to fight it. And so the convention has gone through a series of ups and downs, packing a genuinely comprehensive set of anti-corruption concepts into a framework that does not truly oblige anyone to implement them. While the standards suggested by the breadth and depth of the convention appeared high at first, successive negotiations seem designed to steadily wear them down.

This month, the signatories to the convention met in Qatar (a location surely not chosen for its symbolic value) to determine how they should review each others' implementation of the convention. Such review was required by the original convention, a concept highly praised by anti-corruption advocates. In honor of the latest meeting the latter put forth their usual recommendation: that review should take place both by a country's peers (since this supposedly generates equality and more official confidence in the results) and by independent reviewers in the form of civil society. But such a scenario was never realistic. Instead the signatory governments devised a watered-down review system in which civil society participation is optional.

The truth is, most of these governments indeed have something to hide. Convention signatories include many governments widely understood as corrupt, such as Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, and Zimbabwe. These countries knew that signing the convention would enhance their international image and hopefully their foreign aid receipts, and they took a gamble that the repercussions would not be any greater than having the opportunity to stand in the company of serious corruption fighters. So far they have turned out to be right.